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Capitalist Divination: Popularist-Speculators and Technologies of Imagination on the 
Hooghly River 
 
Abstract 
Economic theory and technocratic policy have long understood economic action to be a 
communicative activity. From Laplace and Adam Smith to current liberalisation fiscal policy 
in India designed to produce price signals and entrepreneurial behaviour this 
conceptualisation has been dominant. Instead this article draws on the anthropology of 
divination to argue that capitalist action is provoked by technologies of the imagination that 
generate speculation. These issues are explored in the context of changing forms of 
governance of the Hooghly riverine economy by bureaucrats in the Kolkata Port Trust. 
Through ethnography we track how public-private partnerships are forged by exemplary men 
or ‘seers’ deploying divinatory action. The fortunes of business, trade and the livelihoods of 
informalised workers rest on these practices, which generate short-term unstable forms of 
capital accumulation. Drawing on this case, we can potentially develop comparative critical 
approaches to the recent emergence of popularist-speculators in India and elsewhere.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Technologies of Imagination  
In this article I wish to explore a rarely asked question: what if capitalist action is 
motivated by technologies of imagination that generate speculation? This is a political 
question because it remains entirely unasked in the disciplines that study economic behaviour 
and in current attempts by governments to manage the economy. These both rely on 
communicative, models in which rhetoric, signals and information are exchanged and 
understood more or less accurately.
1
 This is an important analytical question too because 
from Adam Smith to contemporary economic sociology it has been neglected. The silence on 
this theme is particularly striking given that probability, one of the key devices of economic 
governance, was first imagined by the astronomer and physicist Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-
1827)
 
through the positing of a demon, a secularized version of God.
 2
 This demon had total 
knowledge of the past and present and limitless abilities to calculate the future. Human 
economic action continues to be measured against the qualities of this God-like being in 
university economics and psychology departments across the world.
3
 The findings from these 
experiments have been widely circulated in the media and used in government policy.
4
 Each 
of these experimental and administrative practices, like Laplace’s original formulations, are 
technologies of imagination.
5
 Sneath, Holbraad and Pederson drawing on the anthropology of 
divination have defined such technologies as the material, social practices from which styles 
of imaginative perception emerge.
6
 By asking my heterodox question, as we will see in this 
article, I will be able to make visible the styles of imagination associated with capitalist 
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practice. I will characterise both their general form, and a specific type that has emerged 
since the mid-1980s in relation to state practices of austerity and fiscal discipline. In 
particular I will argue that the imaginative style of capitalism is future-oriented speculation or 
the attempt to divine and manipulate the visible and the invisible aspects of human and non-
human productivity. I will conclude with an even more destabilizing question: is capitalist 
action perhaps shaped by what Malinowski called divinatory ‘magic’ or images of ethical 
order maintained in situations of radical uncertainty? 
  My questions have arisen from my recent fieldwork and archival research on the 
riverine economy of the Hooghly River in West Bengal. This waterscape has been 
transformed since the 1990s as a result of alterations in the practices of the bureaucracy, the 
Kolkata Port Trust, which governs global trade, the environment and production along it. 
These changes are widely represented in government reports as the removal of constricting 
state influence through the ending of: top-down five year plans; state control of production; 
and the removal of a license raj in which permission had to be sought from state entities for 
entrepreneurial  activity. Instead bureaucrats are said to be now ‘freed’ to: make public 
private partnerships; outsourcing arrangements; and to develop the resources of the river 
according to market principles. As in other situations the reality is different from this image 
of liberated entrepreneurial energies and withdrawal of state agents from market control. 
7
 
Instead there has been a shift in the routine work of bureaucrats and in their relationship with 
private businesses on the river. In the past they would have followed top-down instructions 
from five-year plans and developed long-term tendering and licensing relationships with 
specific businesses in order to fulfil these. Importantly the river and its banks were also used 
solely in order to achieve the continuation of global trade. As a public resource the Hooghly 
was not treated as a form of property or environmental resource from which supplementary 
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profits from other kinds of enterprise could be developed. But since the liberalisation of the 
Indian economy in the 1990s the role of bureaucrats has dramatically changed. Austerity 
measures were introduced and they had strict fiscal targets to meet each month by: deriving 
greater amounts of rentier income; outsourcing work; and privatisation. Planning too altered 
with fixed five year plans with detailed instructions turning into general injunctions to raise 
profits and cut costs through any means local bureaucrats could imagine. Bureaucrats turned 
to a variety of short-term plans and relationships with entrepreneurs generated through forms 
of publicity and delimited contracts in order to achieve these ends. This was an amplification 
and intensification of the practices of phatic labor and infra-power that are always part of 
bureaucracy’s ties to urban life.8 By 2008 when I began to carry out fieldwork the river had 
become the site of intense, volatile, popularist speculation. This reflects wider shifts in India, 
and across the world, towards speculative governance marked by contradictory tendencies of 
decentralisation and greater extraction of income from formerly public or common resources 
by state, parastatal and private organisations.
9
 The Hooghly therefore, provides a key place to 
examine the recent history and contemporary forms of capitalist technologies of imagination. 
But before entering this reality and showing how these work, I will turn to a deeper 
explanation of why it is such a significant heterodox move to focus on speculation as a 
technology of imagination central to capitalism. 
Speculation: a counterpoint to a communicative economy  
Laplace forged standard tools for the prediction of economic action, but it was Adam Smith 
who created a resilient model of the content of such action. As Boltanski and Thevenot argue 
Smith’s account was part of his broader political philosophy.10 In this Smith explored how 
egalitarian social bonds could be constructed on the basis of natural instincts. Adam Smith’s 
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answer was that in the market natural sentiments of sympathy drew people together in 
communicative acts in which they contracted with each other to form social bonds. These 
feelings of sympathy derived from humans staging the views and experiences of others in 
their minds from the perspective of an impartial spectator. This took the form of an internal 
dialogue between an “examiner and judge” who took the position of other members of 
society observing one’s actions and an “agent” or person who is your proper self.11 In this 
dialogue we see our actions reflected in an internal “looking glass.”12 He suggested that such 
stagings shaped all social bonds from family relations, hierarchies of rank to economic 
transactions and feelings of universal benevolence to other nations.
13
 Ethics and imagination 
are central to Smith’s model of market action. Yet his depiction of them is limited. They are 
individual mental states that arise from immediate communicative signals and their effects on 
the imagination. This has led to a recurrent representation of capitalist encounters as events in 
which:  
individual human habits of mind and information/signal = decision = coordinated 
action 
Traces of this model are present in most contemporary economic approaches from theories 
of: optimization under constraints; heuristic analysis; ecological rationality and information 
asymmetries. More recent work attempts to account for affect as part of decision making in a 
scientific exploration of Smith’s moral sentiments.14 Or it looks at inequalities produced by 
asymmetries of information within the marketplace.
15
 Yet all economic practice is still treated 
as a form of more or less efficient or flawed human communicative action based on 
individual mental habits. 
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Economic sociology breaks from this model in some significant respects, but not in 
others. It traces the social and historical rather than natural underpinnings of economic 
activity showing that, “markets are explicitly moral projects saturated with normativity.”16 
But from Granovetter to Beckert it is still frequently focussed on economic action as a 
process of communication of information through which bonds are formed. This approach 
rises to its most sophisticated version in the recent relational economy that explores how “in 
all areas of economic life people are creating, maintaining, symbolizing and transforming 
meaningful social relations” in ways that generate inequality.17 I draw on elements of this 
approach here in my analysis of the relational ethics of speculation on the Hooghly. Yet even 
this sociology remains focussed on how people work to forge and communicate bonds in 
various more or less ambiguous circumstances.  
In contrast to this problematic that unwinds from Adam Smith, anthropology 
potentially offers a heterodox understanding of capitalist action. This is derived from 
Malinowski’s work on uncertainty and magic that has led to a tradition of analysing 
divination.
18
 This emphasises technologies of imagination that invoke an invisible realm and 
make it visible in order to explain the past, present and future. These technologies are used in 
encounters not as a medium of communication or to transmit information. Instead they 
generate a superabundance of meaning through the use of representational and presentational 
symbolism.
19
 They are wielded by exemplary figures, seers who work with the performative 
powers of words.
20
 These people generate ethical significance for the present moment by 
inserting it in a long-term trajectory of the past, present and/or future.
21
 Most importantly 
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they create truth-events by bringing “relevant meaning trajectories together ‘by 
coincidence.’”22 This anthropology of divination can be used to construct a quite different 
model of capitalist action. We can posit it as motivated by forms of augury that make visible 
invisible forces and promise to draw humans closer to knowledge of the hidden patterns of 
society and the universe. Decisions are not taken on the basis of information, human habits of 
mind and agreement alone as suggested in much of economics and sociology. They are also 
taken as an effect of the deployment of technologies of imagination or, in other words, 
through speculation. Such an approach gives us tools to further develop Tsing’s insight that 
much of capitalism works through an economy of appearances that provokes social action 
and capital accumulation through the positing of possible futures.
23
 My schematic version of 
capitalist practice would therefore be quite different from the standard communicative model:  
divination technologies (truth event) and human habits of mind = speculation = 
coordinated action 
 In the ethnographic discussion that follows, I explore the forms and social consequences of 
such speculation in liberalisation India. This is based on eighteen months of participant 
observation with bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and the working poor on the Hooghly river along 
with historical research in the Kolkata Port Trust archives (From 2008-2009 this was 
continuous fieldwork; later followed by shorter return visits in 2010, 2011). During my 
project I was drawn into networks between the state-run port trust and private sector 
businesses in Kidderpore, Howrah and along 125 km of the Hooghly River as it winds from 
Kolkata down to the Bay of Bengal. Importantly the speculation I traced was generated 
directly out of liberalisation policy, which aimed to produce a new kind of economic 
governance. This was built on a communicative model very similar to that dominant in 
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economic theory that has been used widely in central banks from the 1980s.
24
 This focussed 
on sending the correct signals to private corporations and investors, but has unintentionally 
generated a new kind of popularist-speculator. This is a disjuncture between representations 
of the economy in policy and its effects that is familiar from other settings.
25
 These historical 
shifts provide a further reason to problematize a communicative model of economic action. 
This model is activated as a global form within institutions with important social 
consequences. I expand on this theme next through an examination of the emergence of the 
popularist-speculator in liberalisation India. 
Liberalisation: an Indian communicative economy and the birth of the popularist-
speculator 
Analyses of Indian liberalisation have overturned the view that it was a sudden event marked 
by the acceptance of an IMF loan by the Congress led government in 1991 and subsequent 
fiscal reforms of 1992. Instead it is understood to be a result of gradual changes in policy 
from the 1980s under Prime ministers Indira and Rajiv Gandhi as the Congress Party 
attempted to build links with powerful business groups.
26
 Yet what did occur dramatically 
from the early 1990s was a technocratic top-down reform of monetary institutions. These 
reforms had a single goal. This was to redistribute access to the money supply in the forms of 
savings and credit from the state sector to ‘more efficient’ private entrepreneurs and 
investors. These reforms were modelled on World Bank Structural Adjustment programmes 
under the influence of Montek Singh Aluwalia (key economic advisor to the government 
during this period, who had worked at the WB from 1968-79) and Manmohan Singh (trained 
at Cambridge by Keynesians, but collaborated with IMF director Michael Camdessus in late 
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1980s to develop ideas for reform in India) who both put technocrats from the World Bank 
and IMF at the head of most departments. State regulation of the money supply would be 
limited to supporting the legal and institutional environment to make markets work for 
themselves. The key point here is that these measures sought to create growth by handing 
over to the population the task of generating productivity. The citizen would ideally replace 
the government bureaucrat and the politician in this role. The bureaucrat would, on the other 
hand, practice fiscal discipline to make sure that the state’s share of credit and savings was as 
small as possible. This all would be achieved by constructing new forms of capital market 
and banking intermediation in the economy. It was out of these reforms that the popularist-
speculator was born. The term popularist-speculator is appropriate for two reasons. First, 
because the reforms were literally an attempt to popularise capital speculation. Secondly, 
because policy statements depicted the measures as a democratic liberation that would 
produce greater prosperity for a greater number of people by overturning the influence of 
state and political elites. These policies substituted economic for political liberation.  
What then were the measures introduced? How did they generate popularist-
speculators? Policies focussed on three key areas: public debt financing mechanisms; banking 
reform and reform of capital markets. All of the measures were designed to redistribute 
capital into the hands of private investors; to inspire them to have confidence in new capital 
markets and to create corporate profits and investment activity. These interventions were 
based on an official interpretation of the fiscal crisis of 1991 as the result of a ‘financial 
repression regime.’27 The 1980s were described as a period of stagnation in growth because 
the state pulled all capital towards itself in high borrowing requirements. In particular it drew 
household savings through statutory pre-emptions from banks at below market clearing 
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interest rates that rose from 25% in 1964 to 38.5% of net demand and time liabilities in 
September 1990.
28
 These statutory pre-emptions were the requirements of banks to hold a 
particular standard liquidity ratio in the form of government bonds. It was these repressive 
measures and high deficits that were held responsible for the increasing current account 
deficit of the government that led to the fiscal crisis in 1991. The problems were also 
attributed to the government favouring debt flows from international lenders rather than 
equity flows from international and domestic private investors. In addition the existing form 
of financing the government by the Reserve Bank of India issuing long term treasury bonds 
with interest rates fixed by governments was seen as inflationary. This standard interpretation 
was widely disseminated by key players in influential US business school journals and other 
forums. It drew directly on World Bank structural adjustment practices and focussed on 
altering relationships between the state, banks and popularist-speculators. 
Public debt reform and financial sector reform were interlinked. The auction of 
government securities on the capital markets began alongside the deregulation of interest 
rates. The statutory pre-emption levels in banks were reduced. The system of automatic 
monetization of deficits was phased out between 1997-98. The Reserve Bank of India started 
to promote a government securities market. These measures were aimed at ‘deepening the 
financial liquidity’ of the capital markets. New public debt bonds issued to capital markets 
were crucial to this process in two ways. First they would allow the market rather than the 
government to set interest rates. Secondly, the buying and selling of these bonds, the 
secondary market, would also produce profits for intermediary agencies such as banks rather 
than government bonds just statically resting in banks as part of their standard liquidity 
requirements. Thirdly the yield cycle of government bonds provides the base line in the yield 
curve for capital market investors and therefore is essential to practices of predicting the 
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future in markets.
29
 Public debt bonds in this form have become a new kind of public good.
30
 
They are no longer a political demand for finance; they are financialised instruments essential 
to the prediction and generation of profits in capital markets. Alongside these moves there 
were better known reforms including: market determined interest rates and exchange rates; 
current account convertibility; and the deregulation of the equity market.  
These reforms of banks and capital markets were coupled with attempts to reduce 
public borrowing and lower public deficit. Fiscal discipline was first introduced within public 
sector institutions from the mid-1980s but it intensified from the 1990s. Formal legal 
measures were introduced such as the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management 
Responsibility Act of 2003. Importantly these policies did not reduce central or regional state 
debt.
31
 Instead they transformed the nature of this debt. It was now treated within 
bureaucracies as a fiscal problem of repayment rather than a political gift of resources. As a 
result the function of the public sector in India was transformed and figures of debt 
dominated in day to day decision-making.
32
 The public sector became more intensely 
extractive in new ways.  
At the core of these policies is a technocratic vision of the economy as a zone of 
communicative market exchanges governed by risk-probability calculations. They have a 
strong affinity to the academic approaches to capitalism that have unwound from Smith’s 
imaginative formulations of the market. The goal is for the economy not to be distorted by 
political control of the money supply, but instead managed by the Central Bank and high 
level bureaucrats through arms-length market-making and signal mechanisms. Characteristic 
of this are statements such as that of Usha Thorat (Career at RBI since 1972, Deputy 
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Governor of RBI 2005-2010) writing on the future of government debt markets in India 
(2002):  
 
The efficient allocation of resources is a consequence of the level of financial 
market development…The role of markets is to generate accurate information about 
risks and rewards…The essence of efficient markets is information processing to 
facilitate efficient asset pricing and resource allocation.
33
 
 
These policies result in a devolved form of economic governance in which capital markets, 
private corporations and households are charged with the responsibility for producing 
investment and growth. Alongside this bureaucrats are given a new role—to reduce state 
deficit and generate entrepreneurial activity. Or in other words, this communicative model of 
the economy generates popularist-speculators charged with the responsibility of predicting 
and sustaining the growth of capital. Fiscal reforms attempt to incite them to make constant 
micro-level banking, credit, investment and entrepreneurial decisions that decide the fate of 
the national economy. They must speculate: or discern the hidden relationships between the 
visible and invisible aspects of human and non-human reality in order to sustain the 
economy. How, then, did this birth of the popularist-speculator play out in relation to the 
Kolkata Port Trust bureaucracy on the Hooghly river? 
The Kolkata Port Trust governs global trade on the Hooghly River. It has custodial 
care of the environment, owns large tracts of land, taxes and licenses trade and orchestrates 
the labour of formal and informalised workers in the docks, shipyards and small-scale 
enterprises along the Hooghly. In the period from 1991-2011 trade has grown spectacularly 
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with cargo levels of 15.240 million tonnes rising to 47.54 million tonnes.
34
 But alongside this 
liberalisation has led to a radical austerity drive that has produced: decrepit infrastructure; 
growing informalized labour; and the emergence of entrepreneur-bureaucrats and private 
businessmen joined in speculative planning.  Financial austerity began in the Port Trust 
through the 1980s, but intensified after 1992 reaching a peak in 2000. This austerity was 
more than simply a restriction of funds from the centre, it was a more intense form of 
centrifugal extraction from public resources and labor towards the state and commercial 
interests. Through the second half of the 1980s the Ministry of Surface Transport (MOST) 
started to encourage the port trust to take on debt at commercial rates of interest from banks 
and other state agencies. As a result by 1991 it had borrowed Rs 214 million of intercorporate 
loans to finance itself. In 1994, this process was amplified because MOST converted old 
political debts into monetary ones. Loans from the central state to the Kolkata Port Trust had 
been in permanent moratorium since they were incurred during 1960s-70s for the 
construction of Haldia port. MOST now transformed these into monetary debts. They 
instructed the Port Trust that the amount of Rs 1.6 billion of the original loan and the interest 
up to March 1992 of Rs 2 billion would have to be repaid in 20 equal annual instalments from 
the financial year 1993-94.
35
 These moves profoundly altered the bureaucracy, which became 
focussed around crisis ridden calculation of how to divest itself of liabilities and generate 
greater revenues. The port reduced its permanent workforce in the period from the 1980s to 
2000 from 34,492 to 11,514 employees.
36
 The work of cargo-loading, ship-building and 
repair and marine crewing was outsourced to contractual labour. Multiple schemes for 
generating revenue from land and river resources have been attempted. Lack of regular 
dredging has led to reductions in depths and tighter navigation along the Hooghly. Any 
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actions taken by the bureaucracy had to be low investment and high return, producing 
increasingly exploitative uses of casual labor working in dangerous under-regulated 
conditions.   
These moves were entirely different from the public face of liberalization.  In 
publicised inquiries such as the Interministerial Group set up by MOST to examine private 
participation in ports—there is only mention of introducing enterprise and efficiency.37 In a 
reprise of the communicative model these measures would be supported by offering correct 
incentives in the form of favourable contracts and funding from loans from the commercial 
sector. Central government five year plans, now also only made mention of the prosperous 
future of public-private partnerships. The reality of the new forms of capitalism on the 
Hooghly are not readable from these public policy accounts. It is to the characteristics of this 
capitalism that I turn next. I will describe its relational, speculative economy that is built 
through the use of imaginative technologies by exemplary ‘diviners.’  
Diviners: the powers of exemplary men 
Enterprise on the Hooghly is now profoundly shaped by the actions and reputations of 
exemplary men. These men practice the art of jogajog kora—or the formation of extensive 
friendly ties between private businesses and public offices.
38
 Jogajog kora literally means to 
add and add again, or to amplify connections outwards from a centre. The formation of 
relations occurs through revelations that invoke an invisible realm and further concealed 
realities. These men are perceived as unique diviners of these realities and their places of 
work are sites for speculation. Other men in river trades collect in them to hear of potential 
business. In my ethnography I will focus on how the trade of inland water transport (IWT) 
unfolds in relation to these practices. I will show how entrepreneurs pursue this trade through 
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connections to and projections of potency onto two exemplary figures. These men are 
bureaucrats in the marine department linked in a chain of command: the high level Mr 
Deshpande and street-level Mr Bose. I will also reveal the perspectives of informalized 
shipyard workers whose livelihoods have changed as a result of speculation on inland water 
trade.  
Exemplary men on the Hooghly shared a conversational style. From my first meetings 
with them they: confided secrets; revealed previous mistakes; unveiled the ‘real’ forces at 
work; and mooted potential schemes. At the same time they suggested that they should not be 
acting in this way since they worked for a highly secretive organisation. Later I realised that 
they had the same manner with all the clients that entered their offices. In fact they forged 
relations of jogajog kora through these performances. These actions were their response to 
the aggressive fiscal demands from MOST and the Chairman to raise revenues through 
stimulating trade and public-private partnerships. They experienced these demands as a 
constant state of crisis. Weekly and monthly departmental meetings focussed on how to keep 
the trade on the river running with decrepit infrastructure, reduced manning and how to raise 
further revenues for the port. The revenues taken in by each bureaucrat’s office were 
carefully enumerated. Although the actual amount of the port’s deficit was opaque, 
bureaucrats spread rumours about how actually large, and quite how hopeless, it had become. 
Whether the docks in Kidderpore and Haldia, and their jobs in the marine department, had a 
long term future was also constantly debated, given the vast investment needed to re-equip 
and repair these. Men even wondered if there would be enough money in the future to pay 
their pensions given the current fortunes of the port. The deficit was seen to have direct 
personal consequences for their fate. Yet bureaucrats had no tangible powers to improve their 
situation apart from provoking speculation, which at times gave their search for sources of 
prosperity a desperate intensity.  In their encounters with entrepreneurs they combined 
representational and presentational symbolism invoking vast concealed potentially productive 
forces. As we will see from the following account, these forces varied in their qualities from 
macro-economic and political realities to divine nature. 
Mr Deshpande had worked his way up the port trust hierarchy starting as trainee river 
pilot in the 1970s. He now ran sections of the marine department from head office in BBD 
Bagh. Always as he spoke he traced arcs of statistics and complex causal factors that made 
the port the centre of giant economic forces. He recurrently explained that the fortunes of 
trade in the port are not due to the institution itself; it prospers or fails due to the command 
for cargo. For example one day explaining the fate of trade to Haldia he began: 
India has a GDP growth of 9.5% so its fuel consumption and manufacture of steel has 
also naturally increased. So coal trade has increased through Haldia and the volume 
continues to go up. Vessels bring coal into Haldia and then on the return journey they 
take iron ore from Bihar and Orissa to China. The iron ore growth is due to the great 
demand from China linked to the aggressive growth in its economy. The other return 
product out of the port is thermal coal, but this has a complicated present and future. 
This is because the unions in the coal fields at Asansol are refusing to let these be 
privatised …This makes it tricky to have a regular supply through Haldia. 
Mr Deshpande presents a vast macro-economic scale for his actions (Tsing 2005). He also 
builds these forces into prospective vistas combining them with rumors of potential 
investment and obstacles to this. So for example discussing the inland water trade he said: 
The government has given a barge builder subsidy and has said it will build jetties to 
make trade increase, but the most important issue is the question of how to tap cargo. 
If you make jetties in the right place then traffic will come, but no one is seriously 
trying to map the potential sources of cargo. The problem is that the powerful road 
lobby actually won’t allow the development of inland water trade. But we just need to 
tap the markets, we need to set up a proper marketing group that can survey the 
potential cargos. In fact an American came from Tennessee only yesterday from a 
private venture capital company to ask my advice on places to invest along the river. 
 Mr Deshpande grounded his authority to productively manipulate these forces in his deep 
technical knowledge of the river and experience of its force from his encounters with 
cyclones. The contrast he drew was between himself and top level IAS bureaucrats in the port 
trust, who circulate between different state sectors. As an illustration of this he would 
mention the failure of the virtual jetty. This was a group of vast buoys linked by chains 
located at Sandheads beyond Sagar Island at which large ships would anchor and offload into 
barges. But the scheme was a failure because the weather was too rough most of the year and 
the work conditions too difficult. Mr Deshpande confided to his clients a vast scale of 
economic, political and natural forces that he allowed them to glimpse and claimed he had the 
knowledge to manipulate. Combining stories, rumors and secrets alongside macro-economic 
indicators he invited speculation on the realities behind the surface of things. 
Mr Bose, a thirty year veteran of the Kolkata Port Trust, worked in a riverside office 
monitoring and licensing small vessels and their trade. He invoked a different kind of hidden 
force of productivity to his clients: divine nature. In his office he surrounded himself with 
images of Lakshmi, Ganesh and Kali and shared prasad with his visitors.
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 He liberally gave 
simultaneously religious and business advice. For example one day Mr Bose asked one of the 
IWT entrepreneurs who sought his help on his project whether he was feeling unwell. The 
man said he had stomach and mind problems even though he carried out daily pujas to Siva 
and wears astrological stones. Mr Bose dramatically seized his hand and said let me look at 
your palm and I can advise you. His diagnosis was that the man should combine with his joint 
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family in his enterprise. He should also carry out morning pujas to both female and male 
deities because: 
There is always a higher power supporting or impeding your endeavours. Your 
mother gives birth to you. It is because of the mother and the goddess that you are 
here. This is the only reason I sit in this space helping people because the goddess has 
put me here 
The divine was a constant reference point in business for Mr Bose. It gave a foundation for 
the productivity of his actions. He associated this divine with nature, especially the forces 
manifest in the Ganges/Hooghly. He frequently explained that all the technical interventions 
he supported on the river worked with, not against divine nature. Therefore they would be 
successful since they were unlike the unnatural measures currently causing the siltation of the 
river. He often claimed that in order to understand the Ganges/Hooghly you had to remember 
how Bhagirath made her in the first place through directing her power with the support of 
Siva. For Mr Bose the inland water trade was a perfect example of a technology that 
productively directed the strength of the river and did not “create pollution.” Mr Bose also 
infused his actions with a Bengali nationalist ethic. For example he argued that the IWT 
would release the natural potential of the Ganga and all its waterways stretching to 
Bangladesh. This was a unity that had been lost by partition. He suggested that the flow of 
new boats would overturn the terrible loss of thousands of boats at partition that were 
stranded in the suddenly foreign territory of East Pakistan. Enterprise was filled with 
superabundant meaning for both Mr Bose and his clients through these invocations of 
divinity, natural productivity and history. 
Both bureaucrats also gave vistas onto less sublime productive forces that they could 
bend towards their clients. They discussed the rules of the port with entrepreneurs looking for 
potential ways to make businesses from them. They gave advance news of tenders and advice 
on how to approach them. They both specialised in ‘revealing’ concealed conspiracies that 
lay behind the surface of publicity statements released by the port. They also introduced 
entrepreneurs to each other for their mutual benefit. In addition they made evident their own 
abilities as popularist-speculators for their clients with stories of tips on shares. For example 
one day, Mr Bose’s stockbroker called him. He loudly berated him to not sell stocks that were 
falling. The phone call over, Mr Bose then told his assembled clients that the news had come 
to him that Jindal were trying to buy up the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation 
(CIWTC). TATA, he added, was planning to set up a steel factory in Bangladesh and 
therefore would need to export raw material. Mr Bose claimed that Jindal had realized this 
and were trying to buy up CITWC so that TATA would be under the grip of Jindal. I asked 
him how he knew all of this and he said, “It is like the smell of earth in the rain. You come to 
know the atmosphere” provoking appreciative smiles from his clients. All port officials were 
enthusiastic purchases of shares, adding their public sector wages to the deepening of 
financial markets. They also performed this fact to private sector friends gained through 
jogajog kora. As Mr Biswas put it we constantly keep track of macro-economic indicators 
such as the global price of oil and unfolding hidden plans because, “We all have shares now.” 
This evocation of the scales of pragmatic earthly and more sublime economic or 
divine forces generated a superabundance of meaning for clients. Many entrepreneurs told me 
in awe of the help that both men had given them. The power of these men came from their 
ability to appear to direct time and coincidence towards productive acts. They made meaning 
from accidental occurrences turning them into truth events. I watched this process many 
times with entrepreneurs, as bureaucrats directed them towards upcoming government 
schemes and found partners to support different aspects of the business. This made time 
appear ripe and full of potential that could not be refused. One day this was turned towards 
me. I arrived in Mr Bose’s office who as soon as I entered announced: “There have been 
some major developments here Laura. I have decided to give logistical support to producing a 
vajrao [high caste landlord’s pleasure boat] for concerts on the river.” He continued: 
The people who can build this in their shipyard by converting an old barge came in 
this morning. Then you came right afterwards. Also the tourism board is encouraging 
this—here is their publicity leaflet. This must be the work of God because you came 
into my mind and then you are here. 
Fortune condenses into a moment that has to be seized. There are no coincidences, only a 
larger design from which money can be made.  
Bureaucrats such as Mr Deshpande and Mr Bose gain authority as ‘seers’ through 
deploying technologies of imagination. It is important to remember that their aim is to 
stimulate private public partnerships in line with the liberalisation communicative economic 
model. However, their methods do not follow the techniques of confidence generation 
through price-signals and contracts depicted in these models. The new forms of capitalism on 
the river are created out of speculation. In the next section I will follow the development of 
the IWT trade from the perspective of entrepreneurs attempting to act on the complex stimuli 
offered by bureaucrats. I will also describe the chronically unstable and exploitative forms of 
capitalism created from this speculation. 
Entrepreneurial Speculation: the uncertainties of inland water trade 
Until the late 1990s IWT trade on the Hooghly to Assam and Bangladesh was controlled by 
the unionised, state run Central Inland Water Transport Corporation (CIWTC). This 
organisation was undermined by the same transformation of debt relationships as the Kolkata 
Port. It was labelled as ‘unprofitable’ with no further infrastructure investment in its ship-
building yards or equipment. In 2002 a small amount of Ministry of Shipping government 
funds were provided to revive it, but only under the condition that it shed a third of its 
workforce in three years and outsourced vessel repairing and construction work to private 
shipyards.
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 As CIWTC has declined MOST, the ministry of shipping and the Kolkata Port 
Trust have also hollowed it out by encouraging private barge trade on the river. This seemed 
a particularly attractive option to these agencies because the depths in the Hooghly were 
dropping rapidly due to lack of MOST support for dredging. This made barge transport 
appear to be the only low cost viable future for long-term trade on river. Moves towards 
private trade were also in line with central government policy. Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then 
BJP prime minister, had announced a nationalist Sagar Mala or ‘garland of the seas’ 
initiative. This aimed to revive the inland water and coastal trade through the promotion of 
private operators and investment. On the Hooghly a few private barge companies were 
already operating jetties exporting foodstuffs without licensing from the port trust. The time 
seemed ripe and bureaucrats in the marketing and marine department of the port tried to seize 
the moment by working how to regulate and collect wharfage and license fees from the 
private barge trade. Yet they had to balance this carefully so as not to ‘repress’ the trade 
through too aggressive revenue generation. In September 2003 they organised a joint meeting 
with the CIWTC, Inland Water Authority of India and private barge operators to develop 
their policies.
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 The outcome of this was the: negotiation of regularised port profits from 
private trade; the lifting of the expensive, restrictive requirement of having a river pilot for 
navigation; and the granting of longer jetty, vessel and trading licenses. All of these measures 
led to a rapid expansion of un-unionised private barge trade on the river and in private sector 
shipyards building and repairing vessels. The commodities traded included iron ore, grain and 
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wood, but the boom was in fly ash. As I will explain next these two trades of fly ash transport 
and private shipyards are chronically unstable and highly dependent on practices of jogajog 
kora and speculation.  
Speculative Practices in Uncertainty: Rumors and Jogajog Kora in Fly ash Transport 
The fly ash trade is controlled by three firms—here I will focus on the one I know best Arnav 
Ltd. These firms buy fly ash from power stations such as the Calcutta Electrical and Supply 
plant downriver from Kolkata at Baj. They then liaise with shippers with export licenses for 
fly ash so that they can transport this toxic by-product of electricity generation to use in 
cement factories there. In order to reduce costs these companies lease Bangladeshi barges, 
which are cheaper than local vessels. These travel through inland water ways via the Padma 
from Narayanganj to Namkhana in West Bengal and then up the Hooghly to Kolkata. Arnav 
Ltd alone sends 50 barges each month along this route. This is a risky trade. Margins are tight 
given the expenses of paying CESC, the shipper and Kolkata Port. As a result costs are cut at 
every turn. Vessels are hastily converted and barely safe. No insurance is taken out and it is 
unclear whose responsibility it is to rescue and recover private vessels. In addition the 
unpredictable silting of the Hooghly due to lack of government dredging make journeys 
difficult to navigate. From 2007-9 for example four barges sank and one collided with a port 
trust vessel. This chronically uncertain, dangerous trade is a direct product of liberalisation 
reforms, although it looks very different from the ‘efficient’ plans mooted in the Sagar Mala 
initiative or MOST five year plans. It is generated from bureaucratic speculative practices 
aimed to stimulate private sector enterprise. It is a trade that also relies on speculative 
practices and the relational economy of jogajog kora to continue. Let me illustrate this 
through the arc of Arnav Ltd’s trade during my fieldwork. 
I first came across the owners of Arnav Ltd, a combination of Bangladeshi and 
Kolkata based businessmen in the office of Mr Bose. They were seeking his advice on how to 
legally handle their barge which had run aground near Nayachar Island. Because it was 
carrying heavy fly ash it had split into two in the middle and was blocking the channel. Now 
there was a dispute about what to do with it. It was a Bangladesh Government Barge 
outsourced to a second party and then leased by Arnav. The Bangladeshi government wanted 
the barge repaired and returned, but the company wanted to sell the remains for scrap. The 
owners were seeking Mr Bose’s advice on the legal document they intended to present to the 
Bangladeshi government. In spite of the difficult circumstances Mr Bose and the owners 
became expansive about the potential of their trade. Mr Bose announced that in ten years fly 
ash would be a more important product than electricity. Then the group began to discuss how 
coal will run out, but fly ash will still be important, because concrete would always be 
necessary for construction. Later Mr Bose explained to me that by giving Arnav Ltd. help he 
is both doing the ports work by clearing the navigation channels and helping private trade 
too. Over the months that followed events became even more difficult for ArnavLtd. In their 
situation of uncertainty they tried to interpret the complex stimuli given to them by Mr Bose, 
and later Mr Deshpande, and anticipate their actions.  
On a visit to Arnav’s office a few months later, the local officer of the company 
Abhilash Chowdhury explained the recent turn of events. He told me that because there had 
been so many accidents over the past year Mr Deshpande had specified that the barges would 
only be allowed to ply if they loaded at 70 percent capacity. Given their tight margins they 
had to suspend the trade because they could not make any profit from this capacity. Abhilash 
described the ruling of the port as arbitrary and without cause. There was no proof that if the 
barges were loaded at this new volume it would make them safer. Depressed and anxious he 
added that having started this business here, now he felt he might see its end and that his fate 
now rested with Mr Deshpande. As we spoke phone calls were flying between him and his 
associates as they tried to anticipate Mr Deshpande’s decision. The past and the future 
suddenly looked incomprehensible and unproductive. Abhilash confided why he thought the 
KPT were trying to stop the fly ash trade: 
The barge that sunk at Nayachar was because the navigation channel was not 
maintained by the port by dredging. Actually the port was negligent in this case but no 
one will say this. Also the problem is that there is no equipment available from the 
port to lift the barge out of the river so it is up to the owners. So the port are trying to 
end this trade, because they do not have the infrastructure to support the trade.  
Abhilash had grown so despondent that he was trying to project a future for a new trade. He 
explained, growing excited again, that he was looking into the feasibility of exporting rice 
husks, which are needed in the manufacture of steel. He would send them as far afield as 
Germany or Australia in containers from Arnav Ltd’s riverside jetty. But then, returning to 
the present he said the only way through their situation would be to consult with Mr Bose 
who would let them know what was going on with Mr Deshpande.  
A month later these relations bore fruit after many conversations in Mr Bose’s office 
about what to do. Once again I sat with Abhilash as he imagined a hopeful future again. This 
was based on a new development and a rumor provided by Mr Bose. Mr Deshpande had 
finally decided on a compromise in which barges could ply if they: fitted two anchors; were 
weather tight and had a regulated waterline. Mr Bose had, in fact, been put in charge of 
inspecting the vessels, another sign of hope. This development was coupled with the rumor 
that the government would soon be subsidising to 30 percent the building of new barges to 
promote inland water transport. On the basis of all of these new events Syamlal anticipated a 
limitless future for his firm and IWT:  
There is a great future for the building and hiring of barges. There is a demand for at 
least a 100 vessels. You should talk to your husband about this because this has a very 
good profitable future indeed. You could join us. We would build self-propelled 
barges and make our capital back and more in 3 years, look [handing me a piece of 
paper] here are the calculations for it. We will build all of these in that private 
shipyard in Shibpur. Self-propelled will be the future and we will send them 
everywhere to Haldia, Assam and Bangladesh. The whole Kolkata Port may even 
become a barge port. 
Out of the actions of and rumors from exemplary men, Abhilash was now producing his own 
truth event for us both. Capital could be made through the alignment of many suddenly 
visible forces converging together. It was via such speculation, not price signals or 
information that the business would continue. 
Yet there was to be an unexpected twist in the fortunes of Arnav Ltd in which Mr 
Bose also became crucial. The Mumbai attacks in December 2008 disrupted their trade as 
suddenly state borders started to be policed. Rumors were flying in Kolkata that the mobile 
phones used in the attacks had been sourced in the city and that the terrorists met each other 
along the river in Howrah. All Bangladeshis suddenly became suspect, including the crew on 
the Bangladesh barges. Accompanying Mr Bose on one of his inspections of the Bangladeshi 
barges, he explained that Arnav were in deep trouble. Three of their Bangladeshi crew had 
been arrested at the border point at Namkhana. For twenty years it had been the informal rule 
that crews got down at Namkhana to clear customs and other formalities. But when the crew 
did this three days ago the police suddenly threw them in jail. Now all the trade between 
Bangladesh and India was under threat. Abhilash had called Mr Bose asking for his help. Mr 
Bose explained that as soon as he heard the news he rang up the other inland water firms and 
said the Bangladesh government might start taking reciprocal measures so they should not 
allow any Indian crew in Bangladesh to leave their vessels. When we arrived at the fly ash 
jetty the river border was being guarded by three border security police in khaki holding 
guns. Mr Bose began his inspection, but this was interrupted by the customs boat. Officers 
aggressively began to search the vessel turning over bedding in cabins and peering at 
documents urging Mr Bose to finish his work. But the head customs official was an old friend 
of Mr Bose and he stopped to talk to him about Abinav’s case. They discussed how they 
could facilitate the trade again.  
These circuits of speculation and jogajog kora are the substance of capitalist action in 
the uncertain environment of the liberalisation Hooghly. They are sustained by exemplary 
diviners, bureaucrats who do not send price-signals or provide contracts and ‘information.’ 
Instead they stimulate arcs of hope and reveal imaginative possibilities.  
The Inequalities of Speculation: private barge construction 
The business of repair and construction of barges on the Hooghly shifted from the state sector 
CIWTC from the late 1990s. A string of new private shipyards along the waterfront in 
Howrah had taken up this work, alongside the new out contracting from the port and Navy. 
Shipyard entrepreneurs did not make long-term investment in fixed infrastructure or 
permanent workforces in these places. Instead to gain work they tried to bring costs as low as 
possible by assembling temporary un-unionised workers on day wages to construct vessels, 
hiring machinery or using as little equipment as was feasible. This produced de-
technologized and more dangerous work environments than the old CITWC or port trust 
barge yards (Bear 2014). These were set up by people with few capital resources and minimal 
outlay. These family businesses hoped that growing orders brokered through jogajog kora 
would give them the resources to gradually construct fully equipped yards. From the 
speculation on the river on hidden present and future prospects stimulated by bureaucrats a 
new kind of speculative infrastructure of construction emerged. Or in other words, upfront 
investments of fixed sunk capital that would provide safe and permanent working 
environments were not made. Instead temporary infrastructures were put in place that could 
be assembled, expanded or disassembled at short notice. 
Characteristic of these was Vihaan shipyard, whose existence rested entirely on the 
incitements of Mr Bose. Here barges were repaired and constructed for a range of private and 
state clients. The shipyard was a huge open grass field of 18 bighas in which 80 men were 
employed. Near the entrance the owners, two brothers, had started to build a solid concrete 
building for a future planning loft and warehouse. The construction was stalled until they 
acquired more work. A huge grain barge was moored next to the bank, where it had been 
repaired on the river rather than in a dry dock. A small curved inlet from the river acted as a 
conduit to a muddy ‘dry dock’ where another vessel was being constructed. Sheets of steel 
for construction were scattered about the muddy field and welding equipment and wires lay 
tangled in pools of water. The brothers’ business had started in the 1990s as a labor 
contractors supplying temporary workers for repairing vessels in various state yards. They 
even went as far as the Andamans taking their own labor there. The owners explained that 
they had been advised by Mr Bose what to use the land for. He had told them barge building 
had to expand because it is kind to the environment and works with nature. He had also 
spotted the potential of the inlet as a ‘dry dock.’ When Mr Bose visited, he would arrive with 
news of another potential tender for them and in his office he would advise clients to use their 
services. His speculation had generated this temporary, dangerous prospective infrastructure.  
The Bengali low-caste and Dalit workers who circulated between these private 
shipyards complained bitterly about the conditions and wages. They compared them 
unfavorably with the state yards they had previously worked in as temporary labor. Take for 
example the comments of twenty five year old Mohan Kholey, who had worked in state yards 
in the Andamans and Kolkata. He spoke proudly of the ships he had built for the navy and 
port. These he said were sometimes so huge you could go inside and get lost and never get 
out again. He described how the facilities were so much better in these state yards, adding, 
“not like this place that is so dangerous. Here also there are no benefits. If you get injured or 
ill they just pay for immediate treatment. There is no sick leave or pay.” Given the 
uncertainties of their work and day contracts, workers attempted to interpret the rumors of 
contracts and progress of work around. They tried to uncover the hidden present and futures 
of their unstable livelihoods. Inspections of the progress of barges by officials such as Mr 
Bose were watched closely as the results might mean more work. In addition the 
consumption habits of owners were tracked. If these seemed impressive (such as the buying 
of foreign cars) the workers argued over whether this was a sign of excessive profits or 
imminent new orders. Living in tight-knit neighborhoods along the Andul road they spread 
news of potential better work elsewhere. The scale of this more egalitarian speculation was as 
expansive; if ultimately less hopeful than that of bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. This was 
particularly true of the speculation of younger unmarried men. Mohan for example told me 
that he wanted to leave for the Andamans again. He added that one day I would be able to tell 
his whole life story, in the same way he had seen in a Mithun Chakrabarty film that showed 
how from a mistry a man could became an MP in Behala. Other young men such as Bapan 
Pathro had even greater ambitions. He told me: 
I want to leave and go and work abroad. It is alright for me because I am unmarried 
and I can go and make lots of money for a year and then come back secure so 
someone will marry me. I would go anywhere Romania or Singapore. There they 
make 35000 rupees a month 
Ironically proof that these expansive speculations might be realised was often derived from 
the success of shipyard owners. These men were admired for creating businesses from 
nothing in short spaces of time, even though workers bitterly spoke of how they were 
exploited by them.  
The private barge construction yards reveal the inequalities generated from the new 
practices of liberalisation bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. In them we find the realisation of 
central technocrat’s schemes to rebalance the fiscal repression of the state and create 
popularist-speculators. Yet these outcomes look entirely different from the market efficiency 
augured by the imaginative technologies of those technocrats. Here lies a political problem. 
How is it possible to make visible the: instability, temporary infrastructure and dangerous 
labor generated by these schemes, when technocratic communicative models cannot 
recognize these as products of their implementation? I hope I have shown how a heterodox 
focus on speculation has the analytical and political potential to critically engage with these 
models and the policies associated with them.  
Conclusion: Popularist Speculation, Capitalism and Magic 
The account I have given here of the emergence of popularist-speculators out of the 
technocratic reform of monetary policy is not just applicable to India. Reforms in India 
followed the patterns laid down by the World Bank and IMF that were applied to many 
countries in the Middle East and Africa from the mid to late 1980s onwards.
42
 Nor was this 
simply reform that took place in the global south. Central Banks in the U.S., U.K., EU and 
post-socialist countries took on new technocratic roles in: managing the money supply; 
financializing public debt; and developing public-private partnerships in the delivery of 
public services. In every case this was aimed towards the ‘rebalancing’ of the control of 
capital away from the state towards individual entrepreneurs, consumers and investors. In 
spite of the descriptions of these policies as a productive releasing of market forces; they are 
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a new mode of governing and regulating financial speculation (in the strict sense of the term 
as used by Birla). Although their institutional forms and unpredictable effects vary widely 
two elements are constant: we as citizens now have to take responsibility for the creative 
management of the national economy through our individual and household fiscal decisions 
and bureaucrats are charged with a new role of provoking speculation. Paradoxically, as I 
have shown in this article, this does not make us ‘free’ of the state. Instead there is a new 
kind of dependence on the decentralised, disparate interventions of middle and low ranking 
bureaucrats. These administrators do not have the responsibility of promoting long term 
political relationships through fiscal means. Instead they are charged with turning a wide 
range of public institutions into machines for the creation of speculation. This, certainly in 
my case, and most likely in many others, produces chaotic assemblages of highly 
unpredictable and short-term capitalism and a new social role for the popularist-speculator.  
As I have shown on the Hooghly this capitalism leaves people in a state of 
uncertainty, in which, “We know that we do not know.”43 The solutions for this are found in 
the deployment of technologies of imagination and the recourse to diviners. These exemplary 
figures (who exist as much in Wall Street, the Reserve Bank of India and the European 
Central Bank as on the Hooghly) reveal hidden realities and combine disconnected signs into 
truth events. Just as Laplage bequeathed probability modelled on a moral order from which 
we can calculate risk and model economies, these diviners deploy technologies of 
imagination that reveal a hidden order to the world. I would like to conclude by suggesting 
that there is little functional distinction between the practices of divination on the Hooghly; 
the models of liberalisation technocrats; and calculations of probability and risk. All of these 
are forms of magic as Malinowski defined it. For him divinatory magic was “the expression 
of human hope and confidence, of the need for a morally integrated attitude towards the 
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future” that appears precisely in the contexts where “experience has demonstrated to man his 
pragmatic impotence.”44 Ultimately our actions within capitalism emerge from the interplay 
between our experiences of a disordered reality and magical revelations that there might still 
be an ethical order called the economy. In fact Adam Smith’s positing of moral sentiments as 
the foundation for markets can be seen as just one example of such revelation.  
I hope that my article has shown why we should reconsider the standard model of 
capitalist activity as a process of communication as it appears in the theory and practice of 
economics.
45
 We can open up a heterodox, critical field of inquiry if we consider capitalist 
action as a form of divination that is taking on new ethical forms associated with the populist-
speculator in the present. For political and analytical reasons we need to ask more widely--is 
capitalism driven by images of ethical order in times of uncertainty—in other words by 
divinatory magic? 
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